The article analyses the notion of national and regional identity of contemporary inhabitants of Kaliningrad Oblast, as seen by local government officials, NGO activists and researchers living and working in the Polish cities of Elbląg and Gdańsk. For the purposes of the article, nine in-depth interviews were chosen conducted. The article takes into account interviewees' opinions based on their experience, everyday cooperation with institutions and private contacts with individuals from Kaliningrad Oblast. The main question addressed is to what extent inhabitants of Kaliningrad Oblast are perceived to be different from their compatriots from other regions of Russia in matters constituting national community: narrative of history, tradition, symbols etc. The role of the Local Small Border Traffic Agreement (LBTA) between Poland and Russia, which has served as an important means of facilitating crossborder contacts, was also evaluated. The article demonstrates that despite come regional peculiarities the most prevailing level of identity in Kaliningrad Oblast is that related to the feeling of belonging to the Russian nation.
Introduction
Recent years have brought a multitude of events and processes that have greatly influenced the general environment of Polish-Russian relations, both at interstate and regional levels. Kaliningrad Oblast and the Polish voivodeships of Pomorskie and Warmińsko-Mazurskie play a special role in the overall scope and direction of changes in bilateral contacts due to their geographic proximity. After a period of growth of regional interaction at the turn of the millennia, Poland's accession to the European Union in May 2004 and to the Schengen zone in December 2007 visibly limited the possibilities of cross-border cooperation. On the one hand, the introduction of the (Local) Border Traffic Agreement (LBTA) in July contributed to partly overcoming the negative effects of Poland tightening up its north-eastern frontier as EU's external border.
2 On the other hand, recent tensions related to the annexation of Crimea and the ongoing military conflict in Ukraine have also had its share in the overall atmosphere in Polish-Russian regional cooperation.
In this broad, almost 25-year-old political, economic and social context, questions about the uniqueness of Kaliningrad Oblast have constantly been placed in academic, political and media discourse. To what extent does the region differ from the rest of Russia? Does its geographic separation from other parts of Russia and a different pre-1945 history lead to a different way of thinking of its inhabitants and their identity in general? Is the region special by any way? And, finally: does it alleged uniqueness translate into anything of political nature?
Answering these questions might be daredevil, if not impossible. Therefore, in this article, only the notions of national and regional identity of Kaliningrad Oblast and its inhabitants since 1991 were raised based on the empirical data stemming in the form of interviews which were carried out with people from Elbląg and Gdańsk engaged in cross-border cooperation. The interviews were constructed on the method of in-depth qualitative interview 3 . Less structured than survey interview, it was chosen as the most appropriate method to focus on issues and activities that interviewees were personally involved in. By doing so, it was possible to bring out interviewees' observations and remarks based on their direct contacts with the inhabitants of the Russian semi-exclave. It was also possible to take into account interviewee's different personal and professional experience. In Polish, local border traffic is translated as small border traffic. Thus, many interlocutors used the latter expression in the interviews. 3 The whole research project requires a comprehensive, multidisciplinary approach. Methods applied include those typical for sociology, political science, history, geography (regional studies), as well as urban studies.
The interviews revolved around the following notions: -Values and symbols important for inhabitants of Kaliningrad Oblast, including the relation between symbolic elements of national (state) and regional character, -Semi-exclave inhabitants' attitude towards Russia and Poland as a neighbour (especially in the context of Small Border Traffic), -The role of the Soviet and the pre-war (East Prussian, German) past in their everyday life and the relation between the two, -The influence of the Small Border Traffic on Kaliningrad Oblast's inhabitants in terms of their feeling of national and regional identities.
As interviews usually lasted very long (some of them as much as two hours), responses often took form of storytelling, understood as a wider narrative. As James Phelan describes it, narrative means 'somebody telling somebody else on some occasion and for some purpose(s) that something happened'
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. This definition can be modified in order to better fit into the topic of this article: Somebody telling somebody else on some occasion and for some purpose(s) his/her views on some group of people and their identity in a specific timeframe.
The interviews with nine persons were selected for the purposes of this article: two members of the Fala (Wave) Water Sports Club in Elbląg (Interviewees no. 1 and 2); researcher from the State University of Applied Sciences in Elbląg (interviewee no. 3); high-ranking official and employee of the Marshal's Office of Warmińsko-Mazurskie Voivodeship from Elbląg (interviewees no. 4 and 5); employee of the Marshal's Office of Pomorskie Voivodeship from Gdańsk (interviewee no. 6); employee of the Office of the President of Elbląg (interviewee no. 7); employee of the Office of the President of Gdańsk (interviewee no. 8); co-worker of the European Solidarity Centre in Gdańsk (interviewee no. 9).
Three basic criteria were used for selection. First was interlocutors' professional and personal experience in cross-border contacts with Kaliningrad Oblast. The latter is important as it provides context and side-knowledge of the overall situation in the semi-exclave. Second criterion was the professional position the interlocutors hold. Carrying out interviews with representatives of local government, academia and non-governmental organisations made it possible to get the sense of noncommercial cross-border interactions. Areas where intensity of contacts is high, such as water sports, local government initiatives and academic projects, were identified. Third criterion was the balance between people involved in down-toearth cooperation those performing coordinative and administrative functions provided legal and technical framework for concrete actions.
All the fragments of the interviews and conclusions presented in the article are not meant to be final. They should be treated only as introductory remarks on the broader notion of the contemporary identity of Kaliningrad Oblast and its inhabitants and partial results of the research.
Mapping nation and national identity
Discourse on nation, nationalism and national identity became got exceptionally fierce when modern historiography was born. This process was strictly connected with the development of European nation-states and modern empires. In the framework of expansive and entrenching enlightened monarchies, historiography served as a way of underlining their ancestry and legitimising their power. It also provided a sense of continuity in the rapidly changing societies. Only after World War One and, in particular, World War Two discussions on nations became more conceptualised and less judgemental. This does not mean, however, that today only one universally acknowledged definition of nation exists.
In fact, there is a number of equally important ways of understanding the concept of nation. Significant works on nations and nationalism include those by Rogers Brubaker, Eric J. Hobsbawm, Ernest Gellner, Anthony D. Smith and Benedict Anderson. These authors view nationalism and nation-building processes from different angles: the evolution of pre-industrial societies and the industrial revolution, spread of information technologies, creation and spread of modern literary languages, etc. Amidst them, issues raised by Benedict Anderson are worth noting in the context of this article. Anderson claims that the main factor constituting a nation is the conviction of its members that 'in the minds of each lives the image of their communion'.
5 Even though compatriots might never meet one another, they share the way they think about their own nation. This is made possible by a number of artefacts: national mythology, symbols, certain narrative of history, language 6 , tradition, etc. lies also in his analysis of nation-building processes outside, including former European colonies. Anderson was one of the first researchers to have said that the feeling of nation is subjective. There might be different "objective" features of a group of people: natural boundaries, ethnicity or political independence. Yet what is crucial in building a strong community which might be called a nation is a subjective feeling that such a community exists. In other words, self-awareness of a particular group plays a decisive role. Thus, such elements as narrative of history, culture or language are essential. Other late 20 th century definitions of nation put stress on different elements, depending on regional circumstances or on what kind of nation (political, ethnic) is analysed. Recently, increasingly more attention has been paid to, for instance, the evolution of nation-state, its institutions and its relation towards globalisation, as well as regional integration processes.
Mapping region and regional identity
Whereas nation, nationalism and national identity are well-established and widely used concepts in social sciences, regionalism and regional identity are relatively new, being subject to intensive academic discourse. Sociologists, geographers, cultural or political scientists do not necessarily share the same understanding of regionalism and regional identity. All of these disciplines, however, have at least two things in common while referring to region -it has to have a determined area and features making it distinguishable or unique, which depends on a number of factors that need to be seen in a broader context of political, economic, social and cultural surrounding of a region 7 . Generally speaking, region is an area (understood as land and people) with distinctive characteristics of geographic, political, cultural and historic nature. Territorial aspects are strongly underlined by sociologists and geographers, whereas for cultural scientists they play more subordinate role to cultural and ethnic differences.
8 According to criteria selected by Benedict Anderson, the concepts of regionness and regional identity have much in common with nation and national 7 For a short yet comprehensive analysis of theoretical discourse around regions and regionalism see: R. Väyrynen, "Regionalism: Old and New", International Studies Review, no. 5 (2003) , 25-51. identity. Regional population can also be an imagined community provided that it is able to define the geographic boundaries of its region and that it possesses and accepts distinctive features already mentioned above. All of them influence regional identity. Yet these imaginations are constructed on a less general basis than national one. They are much more rooted into real, unimagined features of a particular area, smaller than the territory of a state 9 . Feeling of regional distinctiveness can go beyond state borders, as well as it can be influenced by cross-border contacts. Growing cross-state regional ties have been a broadly observed tendency, which is often referred to as a part of regionalism. These ties include, but are not limited to, political dialogue (also in the framework of official or semi-official meetings), local government cooperation, joint initiatives in the spheres of infrastructure, education or cultural exchange, as well as factoring in the other party in development planning.
The first wave of regionalism took place after World War Two when West European governments agreed upon the need for greater regional cooperation and coherence. The aim of such thinking was to avoid detrimental military conflicts, especially after the Cold War started looming on the horizon. The European Communities turned out to be the most notable emanation of these actions. Needless to say, there were numerous other or sub-regional integration bodies such as the Nordic Council. Nowadays, we have been experiencing a second wave of regionalism. After the fall of communism at the turn of 1980s and 1990s new perspectives for regional cooperation and integration took shape in Central and Eastern Europe. The bipolar system collapsed. Highly centralised, authoritarian or totalitarian governments were largely gone. Institutional vacuum was quickly filled by such bodies and initiatives as Central European Initiative, Visegrad Group or Council of the Baltic Sea States. This process is sometimes referred to as 'the new regionalism'. As Björn Hettne and Fredrik Söderbaum note:
The 'new regionalism' is a truly world-wide phenomenon, that is taking place in more areas of the world than ever before. Today's regionalism is extroverted rather than introverted, which reflects the deeper interdependence of today's global political economy and the intriguing relationship between globalisation and regionalisation. It should also be noted that the 'new regionalism' is simultaneously linked with domestic factors, sometimes challenging the nation-state while at other times strengthening it. Thus the renewed trend of regionalism is a complex process of change simultaneously involving state as 9 Väyrynen, 'Regionalism: Old and New ', 25-51. well as non-state actors, and occurring as a result of global, regional, national and local level forces. It is not possible to state which level is dominant, because actors and processes at the various levels interact and their relative importance differ in time and space.
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Regional and local authorities were beneficiaries of the devolution of powers in many Central and East European countries. The aim of this process was to build the feeling of responsibility among ordinary citizens. This process was particularly deep in Poland and other 'new' EU member states. Nevertheless, it took place also in postSoviet states, including Russia. In such context, the regional identity of Kaliningrad Oblast seems a particularly interesting case. The Oblast is geographically separated from 'mainland' Russia and is surrounded by Lithuania, Poland and the Baltic Sea. Before 1945, it was part of East Prussia and Germany. Pre-war population either fled or was forced to leave the area. There has been no political, demographic or cultural continuity between German Königsberg and Soviet/Russian Kaliningrad. Such circumstances might lay the groundwork for significant differences between people living in the semi-exclave and their compatriots from other parts of Russia. This, in turn, can lead to the question whether the 'Kaliningrad regionness' understood as more than a geographic and historic distinctiveness exists. Poland's (and Lithuania's) main foreign policy goal will be membership in both NATO and the EU. Thus, from Moscow's perspective, Kaliningrad did not lose its strategic importance. On the contrary, it became all the more crucial. Nevertheless, the beginning of post-Cold War Polish-Russian relations was marked with building legal and institutional framework for cooperation. It was set by four documents: (1) During the first years of existence of the Russian Federation, the question on the future status of Kaliningrad Oblast was raised in some circles. A small number of academicians and political fiction enthusiasts proposed the region to become a fourth Baltic Republic, get divided between Poland and Lithuania or join Germany 13 . Implausible or ridiculous as they were, such views strengthened the feeling of a besieged Russian fortress on the Western sea shared by many Kaliningraders and inhabitants of other parts of Russia. Central authorities in Moscow, no matter how limited their real influence on the semi-exclave in the nineties was, did not want to lose control over it due to obvious reasons.
Although some progress in a regional cooperation involving Kaliningrad Oblast was reached at that time, its overall outcome was overshadowed by growing tensions at the inter-governmental level. Poland entered NATO in 1999, followed by Lithuania five years later. In 2003, both countries introduced EU rules on visas for third-states' citizens, just on the eve of EU's enlargement of 1 May 2004. It caused the border traffic to drop sharply. After Poland and Lithuania had entered the Schengen zone in December 2007, further tightening up of the border resulted in Polish-Russian border traffic hitting its historic low. While smuggling was visibly limited, many claimed that new regulations posed a serious threat to the speed of development of regions alongside Poland's north-eastern and eastern frontier (except for a short stripe bordering Lithuania). The EU acquis communautaire was both the reason and solution for this impairment. Similarly, a framework for limiting negative effects of the Schengen zone was provided by the Local Border Traffic Agreement. 12 M.J. Zieliński, "Cross-border co-operation between the Kaliningrad Oblast and Poland in the context of Polish-Russian relations in 2004 -2011 ", Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review, no. 28 (2012 See: R. Lopata, V. Sirutavičius, "Lithuania and Kaliningrad Oblast: a Clearer Frame for Cooperation", Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review, 1999 . no. 3 (1999 , 51-66.
Polish-Russian neighbourhood: a borderland in the making
Two Polish voivodeships neighbour Kaliningrad Oblast. Warmińsko-Mazurskie is (with few exceptions) a southern part of the former East Prussia and shares much of its pre-war history and tradition with what later became Kaliningrad Oblast. In the communist times, however, there was no interaction between the Polish and Russian territories formerly belonging to Germany. Contacts were limited to rather extraordinary situations:
[…] I did not see it but in the 70s, 80s there were meetings on the border, too. [When] comrades of different sort came, the padlock got removed from the border gate.
[Then] a table was put -two legs were on the Russian, then Soviet side, two legs were on the Polish side. And, behind the table, lads were discussing and drinking. There were such cases.
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The experience of impermeable border is shared not only by people from Elbląg who before the collapse of the Soviet Union had limited contacts with foreigners, but also by inhabitants of Gdańsk -a large harbour city:
I was raised here, in Gdańsk and Sopot, and at the times of communist Poland, that is in 50s, 60s, 70s, when I lived here, no one heard about Kaliningrad much despite the fact that this is a part of Russia so close to us. It was just behind our border.
[…] despite this great friendship between Poland and the Soviet Union neither there were trips to Kaliningrad, nor did Kaliningrad inhabitants came to us. Russian who came here were from Moscow or St. Petersburg, but they were no Kaliningraders.
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Nowadays the two voivodeships, with the emphasis on Warmińsko-Mazurskie, have considerable experience in cooperating with Kaliningrad Oblast, not only in terms of local governments' initiatives, but also in business and tourism. The cities of Gdańsk, Gdynia, Olsztyn and Elbląg are attractive tourist destinations easily accessible by car and bus 16 and train. Recent investments have greatly facilitated communication between Poland and Kaliningrad Oblast. For instance, since December 2010 it has been possible to use the Grzechotki-Mamonovo II border crossing and express motorway from the border to Elbląg and to Gdańsk. 14 Interviewee no. 7.
Interviewee no. 8.
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There are no direct trains between Poland and Kaliningrad Oblast. In the beginning of the nineties there was a commuter train going from Braniewo to Kaliningrad. Later, a direct express train from Gdynia to Kaliningrad was introduced. Last train on this route crossed the border in October 2013.
According to 2014 data, over 1.4 million people live in Warmińsko-Mazurskie (60 people per sq. kilometre) and over 2.3 million in Pomorskie (126 people per sq. kilometre) voivodeships in comparison with 940,000 living in the Russian semiexclave. Population density, due to a much smaller area, is similar (62 people per sq. kilometre). Economic output constitutes a significant difference between the regions. Kaliningrad Oblast's GDP per capita was only two-thirds of that of Russia in 2013 17 whereas, according to 2012 data, Pomorskie's GDP per capita is close to that of Poland. Warmińsko-Mazurskie is less developed (70-75% of Poland's average GDP per capita). The disproportion of development and opportunities was raised by one of interviewees from Elbląg:
Young people leave just as my daughter left for Gdańsk. She said that she was treated there completely different than in Elbląg. And there is a difference in terms of income. And she said, being only at her first year at university, that she had no reason for coming back. A person who moved only 70 kilometres, sir.
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Nevertheless, both voivodeships benefit from LBTA. Over 1.9 million people from the Polish side and over 0.9 million from the Russian side are entitled to obtain permits allowing them to travel to the local border traffic zone without visas. They have used it not only to go to border towns and villages to do shopping, but also to explore tourist attractions and spend leisure time. As a result, the whole area being subject to LBTA has been explored by both Polish and Russian citizens. Yet it seems that the main beneficiaries of LBTA are Elbląg, together with small towns on the border, and Gdańsk. Elbląg is the only Polish city with more than 100,000 inhabitants, lying within 100 kilometre radius from Kaliningrad. Those willing to purchase goods other than basic food products or take advantage of cultural offer travel to Elbląg and Gdańsk, the sixth biggest Polish city with population of over 450,000 and with significant tourist and trading potential 19 . The scope of changes brought about by LBTA becomes noticeable in the light of statistical data. Border traffic increased sharply on both sides (see Figure 1) . The share of people crossing the border based on LBTA permit reached as much as 50% for a number of months. Kaliningraders have become one of the major tourist groups in Gdańsk and the so-called Tricity (Gdańsk, Sopot and Gdynia) cooperation can prove to be extremely useful in researching national and regional identity of Kaliningrad Oblast and the relation between them.
Empirical data: interlocutors' views
The interviews selected for this article revolved around different topics pertaining to Kaliningrad Oblast and its inhabitants. Variety of issues were raised in order to get the best of interviewees' knowledge and observations. Focal points of the conversations were: general quality of cooperation with Russian counterparts, impressions from interlocutors' stays in Kaliningrad Oblast, remarks on inhabitants of the Oblast, their attitude towards everyday life and the past (both Soviet and pre-Soviet), as well as towards their Polish neighbours. To make results of the interviews fit into the rigour of this article, only selected fragments were presented here. The selection was made based on their relevance to the main topic of the article so that they relate to national and regional identity of the inhabitants of Kaliningrad Oblast. The choice is subjective as number of criteria one could pick in order to assess the relation between national and regional identity is very broad. Opinions presented below can only give a hint to what challenges lie on the path to understand the contemporariness of Kaliningrad Oblast in a proper way.
It is worth noting that the majority of interviewees has been living in the neighbouring area all or most of their adult life. The proximity of the border was therefore something normal. Its impermeability, however, turned out to be an obstacle difficult to overcome. The everyday reality on the Russian side, even if not unknown, was not experienced by them personally until they started working in institutions engaged in cross-border cooperation. For most of them, first occasions to travel to Kaliningrad Oblast came at the beginning of the 1990s. Upon arrival in the Oblast, their first impressions were of purely aesthetic nature:
Well, it [the overall state of buildings in Kaliningrad] was awful. It was awfully neglected. Just as if it had still been right after the war. If there was any ceremony to be held, only the veneers were painted, they were not repaired, just paint was put on them and it was all pimped up.
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Such opinions were also a result of interlocutors living in cities which shared their war fate with Königsberg/Kaliningrad. Elbląg and Gdańsk were heavily damaged during the war but they were rebuilt and reconstructed. With few exceptions, Kaliningrad was not:
Interviewee no 1.
So it was a gloomy impression, right? […] I mean, the first impression was -these are really tiny things, these stories -but it was visible that the city [Kaliningrad] requires a lot of care. Especially these suburbs were gloomy, grey. The centre was in the middle of development [reconstruction] . They were renovating the centre, with these churches of theirs.
[…] Well, by us at that time there were renovations taking place already. Elbląg, for instance, got more beautiful, one may say. All of this for them was such a… They would want to live this way, too, I would put it this way. […] they saw the difference in life quality, too.
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At the same time, interviewees were struck by how empty spaces in Kaliningrad Oblast coexist with a new (non-Prussian, non-German) architectural landscape, also in the countryside:
But when you go there [to Kaliningrad Oblast] and you look for those places [old mansions, palaces]. It is just not there. It was dismantled. There is a desert. It is sad when we cross the state border, we enter the Kaliningrad Oblast and suddenly there is nothing on a long stretch. Just as we were on a polygon. And suddenly we enter first villages and we see those colours typical for Russians. Orange and blue colours. We do not have it. There, there is a lot of it. On the one hand, it is sad that we such a picture there, not a different one. But in this way we learn this Soviet or Russian side. Russian.
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Long-term contacts have enabled the interviewees to observe the attitude of Kaliningrad Oblast's inhabitants towards the bygone days. Such topics were rarely raised during official meetings. Talks in which questions about history were tackled were only possible with closer acquaintances or friends. In most cases, interlocutors underlined the importance of World War Two for contemporary Kaliningraders. References to it were also noticeable in mass-media, official propaganda, education system and in everyday life. Some interlocutors were of opinion that they saw little difference between Kaliningrad Oblast and the rest of Russia in this regard. One of them was particularly struck by how former soldiers living in Kaliningrad Oblast pride themselves on wearing uniforms and medals. He was impressed by the strength of the word voyennyi (meaning 'soldier' in Russian), inadvertently bringing associations with solemnity to mind. This special kind of esteem and respect towards war veterans is presented by other people, too. It was so strong that the interlocutor could remember a similar feeling only from his school days: I was afraid. I had respect [towards the janitor] out of fear. And they [Russians] have this respect because of the war. They won the war. It has always been vivid among them, without a single break. And these medals are a very important thing, damn it. He drags these orders, this old man, he barely walks. These orders drag him down but he has them. So they have big respect to these voyennye people. I don't know, maybe they will forget it or maybe they will not.
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In interviewees' eyes, the war pride seems to be connected with national pride among vast part of the inhabitants of Kaliningrad Oblast. In this regard, an interesting comparison between Russians and Poles was made. One of the interviewees underlined the continuity of Russian national pride over centuries and generations. It was brought to the Oblast together with and by new settlers. Over the next decades, it was succoured by the Soviet and Russian state propaganda. The interlocutor was therefore convinced that this feeling had nothing to do with regionness but was of Russian-wide nature. He also expressed some sort of puzzlement caused by such thinking:
And you know what? The way the Russians think I will never understand. Never.
[…] There is Russian pride in them [in inhabitants of Kaliningrad Oblast]. It's there for sure. You cannot poison this pride out. And there is no chance that they will resign from their pride by themselves. It's somehow rooted in their hearts, they have it in their blood since they were born, I don't know.
[MJZ] And this is not a regional pride?
No, a pride is a pride. It's their pride, one cannot touch it, well, one has to respect a Russian, right, because he has this pride of him. Some interviewees began travelling to Kaliningrad Oblast already in the early 1990s. They were congruous with one another that there was little or no difference between the Oblast the Russia. The former was heavily militarised, effectively cut off from the rest of the Soviet Union and was a subject to vibrant propaganda. As some researchers say, the region was meant to be a model for other parts of the country in terms of how a Homo Sovieticus should be like 27 . This view seems to be shared by most of the interviews with little or no reservation: I guess they felt like citizens of the Russian state [back in the nineties]. And they considered it to be normal in Russia and they did not see any kind of difference. Maybe it resulted from the fact that they lacked such things like contact with the West if we treat Poland as the West. But, as I say, I think there was no such feeling that inhabitants of Kaliningrad Oblast are something different that this deep Russia. Yes, yes, they had, when this small border traffic did not exist, they mostly had these Schengen visas. They had a lot of German visas, with no trouble [did they obtain them]. Lithuanian ones they had [too] . They had many of these visas. This small border traffic was you know for whom? For our people, tradesmen. Fuel, cigarettes. This is how it was, that is my feeling. For a Russian [man] did not care that he had to wait for a month to get a Schengen visa. Because they travel to Spain, they travel everywhere. They can afford it, the opulent ones. Because a man who does not have a job or has a low-paying job, he will not [travel] anywhere. These are the rules of capitalism.
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An extreme example of how open and worldly some Kaliningraders are believed to be is the experience of a scientist who carried out many research projects with her counterparts from Kaliningrad. She underlined the easiness which the latter travel with, also to very distant places:
But they go abroad very often, at least these scientists I had contact with. They are people who travel across the world. They take part in many projects, so they are such worldly people, for real. And they are respected there [abroad] , and they see the difference [between Kaliningrad Oblast and places which they visited], back then already in 2006/7/8/10, so 5 years ago.
She instantly added that the possibility of her fellow researchers to travel intensively evokes certain observations and wishes, also when comparing Kaliningrad to Elbląg:
And there is this longing for improving life quality, isn't it? […] I never asked how much they earn but they asked me how much I get: if I earn a living for instance, right? Or if it is enough for excursions. Well, back then there were reconstruction works here, Elbląg got more beautiful, one can say. All of it was for them such a… They would also want to live like this, I would put it this way. […] 31 According to interviewees, such opinions pertain to ordinary Kaliningrad inhabitants, too. The latter tend to underline their distinctiveness in private talks, even if they did not give any specific example of how they were supposed to differ from their compatriots from other parts of Russia: Question about the influence of local border traffic on Kaliningraders was addressed by the interviewees in different ways. On the one hand, they underlined the enormous potential that local broder traffic has in terms of catching up with years of limited permeability of the frontier. They argued that its the economic aspect often plays the most important role for many people using LBTA permits, yet thanks to it, people can do much more than shopping, i.e. spend their holidays in Poland/Kaliningrad Oblast, visit places of historic importance, etc. Such activities do not necessarily have to transpose into closer cooperation in the spheres of culture or self-government and NGOs. Nevertheless, they have the capacity to influence the way of thinking of those who use facilitations provided by local border traffic:
Well, I am convinced that Russians from Kaliningrad Oblast feel their distinctiveness. That they feel they are something different and that Kaliningrad Oblast is something different that this continental Russia. And I think that to a large extent this is the effect of ease, also in terms of communication, but it takes its roots in contact, being abroad more often [also thanks to LBTA]. Also [in] Poland, although Poland is not considered by Russians as part of the West. Yet also here is a different world and… Well, this world they see more often and they interact with them more often than they do with Russia. From what I know, many people from Kaliningrad Oblast have never been to Russia, though they have visited Poland often. They come here for holidays. They even come here for weekends.
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On the other hand, interlocutors expressed much more diversified, if not disparate views on the influence of local border traffic on the identity of Kaliningrad Oblast's inhabitants. The prevailing opinion was that those thinking of it as a driving force of profound identity, political and social change in Kaliningrad Oblast are wrong. Region's population surely benefits from facilitations brought by LBTA but it will not become increasingly different than its compatriots from other parts of Russia. This means that Oblast's inhabitants will preserve memory about events and processes in the history of Russia and the Soviet Union that are present in Because of their professions and jobs, the interviewees have interacted with government and local government officials on a daily basis. The scope of issues they regularly discuss goes far beyond their areas of duty. Some interviewees suggested that regional officials do not necessarily feel special bond with the semi-exclave. They are universal administrators, often born in distant parts of the former Soviet Union, rather than people coming from local communities. Thus, they do not feel obliged to be responsible for the development of Kaliningrad Oblast and increase life standards of its inhabitants: In this context, the sites of historic and cultural value come up as one of questions, which largely depend on actions undertaken by authorities. Nowadays, it seems 34 Interviewees no. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9. 35 Interviewee no. 5.
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Interviewee no. 8. that the level of acceptance for preserving pre-war objects in Kaliningrad Oblast has been growing among vast parts of the local population. A number of unofficial, spontaneous initiatives has been launched in order to raise public awareness in this sphere. In the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union such an attitude was not obvious. There were many controversies as how to treat this legacy. Even today there are many places as symbolic as Immanuel Kant's house in Vesyolovka, which are in an extremely poor condition. Yet hitherto the most known and controversial proposal pertaining to the pre-war legacy has been to rebuild the historic downtown of Königsberg. In the beginning of the 1990s any such initiatives were delicate to the extreme. Hence different approaches of local governments of Elbląg and Kaliningrad in this regard:
So we are sitting today at the Old Town -try to imagine that in 1994 a delegation of Kaliningrad Oblast's regional deputies came [here] . Our task was to show them the Old Town [and the way the reconstruction works were conducted here]. And [one of the deputies] was sitting here like we are now and he said: "It is wonderful -you are building, on these ruins, on old basements a new Old Town. But how am I supposed to explain to citizens [of Kaliningrad] that we need to destroy a Soviet park in order to rebuild German basements?".
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Not all of the pre-war legacy is controversial, though. The Oblast's inhabitants have partially been familiar with it through finding traces of presence of Russia and Russians in Kaliningrad Oblast on their own. For some of the interviewees it seems to be a way of making the land gained after the war less extraneous without losing sight of what has to remain imperturbable in the narrative about Russia's sovereignty over Kaliningrad Oblast and processes that led to it:
They built a monument of Empress Elisabeth at the entrance to the Kaliningrad Trough.
[…] They remember about this [Russian presence in East Prussia during the Seven Years' War], yet this is a distant history. For the contemporariness is what happened in 1945. It [part of East Prussia which became Kaliningrad Oblast] has been conquered and let no one try to take it away from us. For this is the Great Patriotic War of [19] 41-45. This is war again fascism, against Germantsy, This is the thing which they pay most attention to and will continue doing so for a long time. For this is, well, their identity. This is what constitutes them, this is their national awareness. 
Conclusions
From the interviews carried out, rather a complex and multifaceted picture of the inhabitants of Kaliningrad Oblast and their alleged or real distinctiveness emerges. Many diversified opinions were expressed as to what Kaliningrad inhabitants identify themselves with or what their attitude towards their home region and country is. The above-cited fragments of interviews are intended to show that opinions can be a matter of different proportions between knowledge and feelings. This proportion depends on a number of reasons which are often impossible to be identified and results in complicated, often contradictory statements. It is therefore crucial to distil the key elements of interviewees' opinions and views. Output of this intellectual exercise does not have to transpose into a consistent overall picture which fully corresponds to reality on the ground as the latter's rudiments are varying points of view expressed by the interviewees.
There is no and there could be no confident answer whether views expressed by interviewees on the relation between national and regional identity of Kaliningrad Oblast's inhabitants clearly reflect the exact situation in the semi-exclave in the analysed sphere. It is beyond any doubt, however, that the interviewees did have well-established thoughts and reflections on this matter. This is precisely what, in conjunction with interviewees' professional duties, makes their opinions valuable. It also provides a brief introduction to the analysed topic.
The interviewees generally assess their neighbours from Kaliningrad Oblast positively. No feelings of anxiety or reluctance towards Kaliningraders were expressed, both before and after LBTA entered into force. Kaliningraders are perceived to be open and rather outgoing. Increased presence of Russians in both Elbląg and Gdańsk seems to bring no trouble of any nature in everyday life, be it increased road traffic or increased criminal offences rate. Not a single interlocutor complained about Russians being aggressive, stealing or abusing alcohol. There was only single story told about a quarrel in a supermarket over the lack of possibility of paying in roubles. Yet it did not change one of interviewees' general attitude towards Russians from Kaliningrad Oblast. By large, they were described as polite, calm and well-mannered. Based on such a specific and small group of respondents, it is hard to say whether this experience is shared by ordinary citizens of Gdańsk and Elbląg who meet Russians mostly on the streets of their cities and in the shops. Assessing this would require a separate study. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that all interviewees underlined that the unanimously positive attitude towards Russians is shared the lot of local communities of Elbląg, Gdańsk and their vicinity.
Russians from the semi-exclave seem also to be perceived as more or less worldly. They are used to travelling abroad. They do not find it difficult to fit into the everyday reality of regions they visit, also in terms of behaviour as car drivers. This particular view is intricate as it seems to differ from a widespread opinion (or a stereotype) about Russians in many EU countries (including Poland) 39 . Notwithstanding the fact that the interviewees have contacts with a specific group of people from Kaliningrad Oblast, a strong voice on how worldly Kaliningrad inhabitants are is definitely worthwhile.
On the one hand, interviewees painted a picture of people in Kaliningrad Oblast underlining their bonds to their region and noticing its distinctiveness. This bond, most of all, has been of emotional nature, so that it would not be an abuse to use the term 'homeland' in this context. Inhabitants of Kaliningrad Oblast who interviewees had contact with not only stressed the fact that they are from Kaliningrad Oblast specifically (which means 'not from Russia') but they also used such expressions as 'there, in Russia' or 'those people in/from Russia'. Thus, Russia was often referred to as a remote territory, not only in terms of geographical distance but also in terms of an undefined kind of strangeness. Some suggested that it becomes blatant in the political handicap of Kaliningrad Oblast as most of the key decisions on the future of the region are made in Moscow with little respect to expectations of semi-exclave's inhabitants. Russia's capital city is thus viewed as an administrative centre, which usually shows little or no understanding to regional needs. It makes the political hiatus even larger and transposes into other forms of remoteness. Such views are not surprising given a highly centralised power distribution system and decision making process in Russia. The importance of views presented by the interviewees in this regard, however, lies in the fact that they pertained to a very special region of Russia. One can draw a conclusion that its main reason has been the feeling of the Kremlin neglecting the semi-exclave. Distance from the rest of Russia was also visible in practical terms, for instance, travel destinations of Kaliningrad Oblast's inhabitants. Poland, Germany, France and even south-western European states were natural places for them to go to whereas Russia was described as a far-away, difficult to reach territory. Although distances largely depend on inhabitants' financial resources, they seem to visit EU states much more often than Moscow or St. Petersburg, not to mention other parts of Russia.
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Number of studies show that bad driving manners are one of the main reasons for fatal road accidents in Russia. Such studies have been conducted, for instance, by World Health Organisation. See more at WHO Global Health Observatory Data Repository: http://apps.who.int/gho/data/node.main On the other hand, interviewees emphasised features of Kaliningrad Oblast's inhabitants, which were described by them as typically Russian. The most prominent one was the special attachment to World War II that Kaliningraders are supposed to manifest. It seems more than just a dramatic event from the past. Their respect is big enough to risk the thesis that indeed it is believed to be a founding myth for the whole of Kaliningrad Oblast and a historic turning point for Russians from Kaliningrad to Vladivostok. It becomes visible in Kaliningraders' attitude towards war veterans and celebrating 9 May -not only by taking part in official commemorations, but also by their special attachment to small symbols, such as the ribbons of St. George. Such an attitude makes Kaliningrad Oblast's inhabitants similar to the citizens of Russia in general not only in the eyes of the interviewees. It is also envisaged in surveys carried out throughout Russia. According to a survey carried out by the Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration on the 70 th anniversary of the end of World War II (Great Patriotic War), 86.3% of Russians take pride in mass patriotism and front heroism during the war and 39.4% think that the Soviet education (советское воспитание) played a decisive role in achieving victory over Nazi Germany 40 . Thus, there is a high level of convergence between Kaliningrad inhabitants and their compatriots on a state scale in this regard, at least in the opinion polls. The notion of the World War II can be thus viewed as one of important elements constituting contemporary Russian identity. In this sense, there is an 'image of the communion' between Kaliningraders and their compatriots.
It is worth noting that many Kaliningrad inhabitants did not find it difficult, risky or potentially dangerous to commemorate Soviet victory in World War II in Poland where assessment of the results of the conflict is significantly different. Capitulation of Nazi Germany did not mean the end of the struggle for independence and full sovereignty as Poland fell under the Soviet domination. Generally speaking, many Poles share the view that the Red Army brought liberation from Nazism but not from foreign subjugation as such. It might be thus surprising that the interviewees did not mention any incidents connected to this topic.
The pre-war past is also present in the minds of Kaliningrad Oblast's inhabitants, although to a smaller degree. Nevertheless, according to the interviewees, there is a genuine interest in exploring it. Kaliningraders are generally aware that their architectural and landscape habitat differs from what is experienced in other parts of 40 А.Н. Покида, Н.В.Зыбуновская, "Социологический опрос, характеризующий представления россиян о Великой Отечественной войне 1941-1945 гг.", RANEPA, http://www.ranepa.ru/ sociologicheskij-opros-harakterizuyushhij-predstavleniya-rossiyan-o-velikoj-otechestvennoj-vojne-19411945-gg/ Russia. Some would like to rebuild buildings destroyed during the war. Regardless of how numerous such people are, the interviewees largely emphasized that in today's Russia such initiatives are very difficult to set in motion. Any decisions about, for instance, the future of the historic centre of Kaliningrad/Königsberg would have to be made right at the central level, which is not likely to happen. Another obstacle are costs that reconstruction works would generate. Nevertheless, some sort of emotional or sentimental longing for the pre-war reality is present among people from Kaliningrad Oblast who the interviewees had contact with. It is worth underlining that such topics were raised only in private talks. Even those who did so were reluctant about going into details. Reasons for such behaviour remained in the sphere of interviewees' assumptions, mostly connected with current political situation and general sensitivity of this matter. Such an attitude is again something usual in many other parts of Russia.
On the other hand, there is a strong reluctance towards any ideas that pertain to re-establishing some elements from the pre-war period as they bring direct associations with Nazism and World War II to mind. In this respect, being German or Prussian largely identified with Nazism. It seems that the Soviet legacy is much closer to a vast majority of Kaliningrad Oblast's population. It prevails over the German (Prussian) past in the minds and hearts in a natural way if history of the region is taken into account. From the perspective of interviewees, such an attitude is not likely to change in the years to come. There is a direct link between the Soviet times and contemporary Russian identity of the semi-exclave just as today's Kaliningrad Oblast has been a result of a 70-year-old rule of the Soviet Union and Russia over this area. Already in 1945-46, the Oblast was planned to be a complete negation of its pre-war past. The Soviets came here along with Germans leaving and new settlers coming.
Negative reactions to attempts at bringing out the pre-war past are also connected with the post-Soviet reality of Kaliningrad Oblast. Many of its inhabitants remember the uncertainty of the 1990s when difficult economic situation merged with questions about the future a young semi-exclave. By linking the two everything of non-Russian (or non-Soviet) provenience is likely to be viewed as a threat. The Oblast is a part of the Russian Federation not only in legal or political terms. In many areas mentioned by the interviewees, Russianness of Kaliningraders seems to be congruent with the vision of Russianness present in Russian history textbooks, media and official documents. Such a conclusion was drawn by the Sociological Laboratory of Analysis, Modelling and Risk Prognosis of Immanuel Kant Federal Baltic State University (see Figure 3) .
The above-mentioned elements lead to the following supposition: if national identity, inter alia, emotional attachment to symbols, then (according to the carried out interviews) the inhabitants of Kaliningrad Oblast share the lot of what became rudimentary to contemporary official Russian narrative about the history of Russia. Yet at the same time, there is a strong regional component present, which takes its roots not only in subjective but also objective reasons, such as geographic distance from other parts of Russia, separation from its mainland territory, different economic and social challenges and, last but not least, history. Similarly, the feeling of regional distinctiveness evinces itself in the attitude towards public space. The interviewees jointly underlined that living in red-brick houses, next to the ruins of massive Teutonic castles or Gothic churches has to have influence on one's perception. Rarely does it seem, however, to transpose into a way of thinking, which would completely deny elements typical for Russian national identity. It rather provides an added regional value to the primary level of identity: the feeling of belonging to the broad Russian nation with all of this vast historic, cultural, ethnic and social diversity. Thus, it does not have to be contradictory with the knowledge about pre-war events and affection for some elements (people, buildings etc.) of East Prussian (German) past.
Finally, there is the question of the influence of LBTA on what Kaliningrad Oblast's inhabitants think of themselves, their region, home country, compatriots, cultural heritage of the past, contemporariness and international surrounding. From what the interviewees said, the impact of local border traffic has been considerable due to objective reasons: a relatively close semi-exclave, separated from the rest of Russia with a chain of highly integrated EU countries, after a period of limited cross-border contacts was granted a chance to establish closer people-to-people relations with one of its neighbours. Possible consequences of local border traffic for the Oblast were even compared to the situation of communist Poland in the 1970s. Due to some liberalisation of the regime, Poles were allowed to travel to other communist countries and, to a limited extent, to Western democracies. It was then when they saw all the flaws of their home country on a mass scale. It influenced their awareness and contributed to social processes that took shape already in the seventies and creation of the Solidarity movement.
The above-mentioned comparison does not mean that the same will happen in terms of political choices of Kaliningrad Oblast's inhabitants for numerous reasons. Some interlocutors underlined that Poland -although better developed than the Oblast -is not as attractive for Kaliningrad people as the West was for Poles 40 years ago. Moreover, Kaliningraders seem to treat local border traffic merely as an economic opportunity. Statistical data show that such views are at least to some extent true. Indeed, border traffic dropped along with rouble/złoty exchange rate becoming unfavourable for Russians. Yet this drop was not utter. Doing shopping in Poland still, although to a smaller degree, pays off for Russians and/or effects of LBTA goes beyond simple economic calculations. What is beyond any doubt is that it has given a unique chance for both Poles and Russian to interact with one another as neighbours. Additionally, as one of the Polish diplomats dealing with Kaliningrad Oblast said, local border traffic has become something normal. Only in the beginning there was novelty effect present. Recently, however, possibility of going to Elbląg or Gdańsk has been widely perceived as an every-day reality.
Thus, assessing the relation between national and regional identity of Kaliningrad Oblast's inhabitants has to be further researched. It needs to be done by taking into account both the developments in the semi-exclave itself and the overall, Russian-wide context. The former corresponds with the fact that some peculiarities of the Oblast and its population are indisputable and they cannot go overlooked. The latter reminds us, however, that in researching identity there cannot space for subjective prejudices or some sort of 'identity change agenda'. Nor should it take form of wishful thinking, which debars many from seeing Kaliningrad Oblast straight. As one of interviewees said: I don't know, maybe we [Poles] are too gullible, too romantic. We believe that Russians will change, that somehow they will understand.
[…] But we won't force them unless they don't understand themselves in what world they want to live. Unless they don't take decisions about actions themselves. We tend to think that they want [to implement changes], that they come, they ask, they ask us about everything. We show them everything we can. And when they leave, they say: "well, yes, but here it's different".
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It would not be an exaggeration to say that the opinion quoted above about 'making Russians understand' pertains not only to Poles.
